This paper adopts the Impulse-Response methodology to understand in ‡ation persistence. It has often been argued that existing models of pricing fail to explain the persistence that we observe. We adopt a common general framework which allows for an explicit modelling of the distribution of contract lengths and for di¤erent types of price setting. We also evaluate how far the theories are consistent with recent evidence on price and wage rigidity. We …nd that allowing for a distribution of durations can take us a long way to solving the puzzle of in ‡ation persistence, but not all the way yet.
1 Introduction.
In this paper we explore how far existing theories of wage and price setting are consistent with two empirical features: …rst the macroeconomic persistence we observe in in ‡ation, second the microeconomic data on nominal rigidity of wages and prices. There has been a considerable focus on the macroeconomic aspects of modelling in ‡ation persistence 1 . However, more recently there is now a considerable amount of microdata available on the behaviour of prices in the Eurozone and the U.S., which allows us to evaluate existing theories of pricing 2 . Very broadly, we can divide the wage and price setting models into four categories, which di¤er in how they model wage-price behaviour 3 :
1. The wage-price is set in nominal terms for a …xed and known period (e.g. Taylor (1980) , Fuhrer and Moore (1995)) of theories 1 and 2 (Taylor and Calvo) which have for some time been known to be inadequate in this respect (e.g. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) , Christiano et al. (2005) ). There is a crucial di¤erence between the …rst two categories and the second two: in 1 and 2 the nominal wage-price set will last more than one period (usually a period corresponds to a quarter); in 3 and 4, the wage-price will in general be di¤erent in every period. Whilst the sticky information (Mankiw and Reis (2002) ) and Calvo-with-indexing (Christiano et al. (2005) , Smets and Wouters (2003) ) are able to model in ‡ation persistence well, it is at the cost of having prices and/or wages changing every quarter, which contradicts the empirical micro evidence. If we explicitly allow for sectoral heterogeneity with the ranges of contract lengths suggested by the data, we move a long way towards explaining in ‡ation persistence whilst being consistent with the micro evidence on nominal rigidity. We consider two distributions of contract lengths: the Calvo distribution and one derived from US data (Bils and Klenow (2004) ).
In section 2 we present the empirical evidence on in ‡ation and nominal rigidity. In section 3 we outline a generic macroeconomic framework which allows us to explore the di¤erent models and generate impulse-response functions (IRFs) for in ‡ation for di¤erent models within a common environment. We also discuss the calibration of the common framework. In section 4 we evaluate the IRFs of the di¤erent wage-price models and in section 5 we discuss how these respond to a key parameter. In section 6 we conclude.
The Evidence on In ‡ation Persistence and
Nominal Rigidity.
Empirical studies show that monetary policy shocks have persistent e¤ects on in ‡ation. A common way to illustrate this fact is to regress in ‡ation on its own lags and then sum the coe¢ cients on lagged in ‡ation. If the sum of the coe¢ cients is high, then a shock will lead to a changed level of in ‡ation for an extended period. For the U.S., Clark (2006) …nds that the sum of the autoregression (AR) coe¢ cients for the aggregate in ‡ation series is about 0.9. Batini (2002) …nds that for the Euro zone 1970-2002 the coe¢ cients sum to around 0.7, varying across countries. Whilst some studies (e.g. Cogley and Sargent (2001) , Piger (2004), Taylor (2000) ) show that the coe¢ cient is reduced if you allow for structural breaks and regime switches, few would argue for coe¢ cients near to zero 4 . Second, there is the evidence of vector autoregressions (VARs) which introduce another dimension: the shape and timing of the response of in ‡ation to monetary policy. It is widely agreed that in ‡ation exhibits a delayed response to monetary policy. That is, the maximum e¤ect of a policy occurs sometime after the policy: there is a hump-shaped response. Views about the timing of the peak di¤er. The traditional view was put forward by Friedman: monetary policy has "long and variable lags"; the impact on in ‡ation could peak as long as eight quarters or even more. Certainly, this is the view taken by the Bank of England: when setting monetary policy, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) looks eight quarters ahead 5 . The European Central Bank (ECB) takes the view that the maximum impact is six quarters. Di¤erent researchers have estimated the response to be anywhere from four quarters (e.g. Smets and Wouters (2003) ) to twelve quarters (e.g. Nelson (1998) , Batini and Nelson (2001) , Batini (2002) ).
We can summarize these observations by three stylized facts or features:
The biggest e¤ect is not on impact (hump shape)
Feature 2: The biggest e¤ect is (a) after 4Q, (b) after 8Q, or (c) after 12Q (timing of hump)
Feature 3: After 20 Q, the e¤ect on in ‡ation is (a) 1%, or (b) 5% of the maximum (persistence).
In the case of Feature 2, we take three di¤erent values for the timing, corresponding to the moderate view (8Q), the preemptive view (12Q) and the rapid view (4Q). Likewise, for Feature 3, we have two thresholds.
Turning to the microdata on nominal rigidity, there has recently been a huge increase in what we know about pricing as a result of economists gaining access to the data collected by national statistical o¢ ces for the purpose of constructing price indices. Most signi…cant here are the In ‡ation Persistence Network (IPN) in the Eurozone which covers all of the major Euro economies and the work of Bils and Klenow (2004) in the U.S.
The BK data set give us the proportion of prices that change (on average) per month in each of the goods and services covering 70% of the U.S. CPI for the period 1995-7. We can interpret this as a sector-speci…c Calvo reset probability and then generate the corresponding distribution of durations (by duration we mean a "price spell", period in which the nominal price remains unchanged). To do this we use Dixon and Kara (2006a) which generates the distribution of durations across …rms 6 . Having the distribution across each type of good or service, we can then aggregate across sectors using the CPI weights to give us the corresponding aggregate distribution of durations in the U.S. Figure 1 plots this distribution in terms of quarters:
F ig1 : BK Distribution of durations across …rms.
The mean contract length is 4.4 quarters. Perhaps the most striking aspect of this distribution is its skewness: there is a very high share of short-term durations, the share of 1 and 2 quarters is about 50%, but also a tail of very long durations. The European data is similar in broad outline.
PMD1:
Nominal prices and wages remain unchanged for about 4Q on average.
PMD2: There is a highly skewed distribution of durations, with a high proportion of ‡exible prices but a tail of long durations.
Having reviewed the stylised facts we can ask a fundamental question. Is there a model which is generated from a theory consistent Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) framework with reasonable calibrations which is consistent both with the stylised facts about in ‡ation persistence, and also consistent with the micro data? One key feature to note is the combination of Feature 2 and PMD1: if we take the consensus view of an 8Q hump, then we need a theory that can yield a hump despite having a mean contract length of around 4Q.
The Model.
We present a framework which is able to encompass all four wage-price setting frameworks based on the idea of an economy consisting of many sectors 6 The distribution across …rms is equivalent to the cross section across prices set. di¤erentiated by how long a contract (whether of Type 1-4) lasts. Following Dixon and Kara (2007) , we present the log-linearized equilibrium conditions of a DSGE model in which there can be potentially many sectors, each with a di¤erent contract length 7 . When each sector has a Taylor-style (Type 1) contract we have a Generalized Taylor Economy (GT E). When each sector has a Fischer-style (Type 3) contract we have a Generalized Fischer economy (GF E). We will also want to allow for indexation (Type-4). The exposition here aims to outline the basic building blocks of the model. We …rst describe the structure of the contracts in the economy, the wage-setting process under di¤erent models and monetary policy. We then describe the behavior of wages and prices in a log-linear model which encompasses most approaches. For convenience, we present the model in terms of wage-setting, but the framework is also consistent with price-setting (as we discuss below).
The Structure of Contracts.
In this section we outline an economy in which there are potentially many sectors di¤erentiated by the duration of contracts. There are N sectors 8 , i = 1:::N , with sector shares i summing to unity P N i=1 i = 1 : Contracts in sector i last for i periods. There is a unit interval of …rms f 2 [0; 1] and a matched unit interval of …rm-speci…c household-unions (one per …rm). The sector share i is the measure of …rms in sector i: Within each sector i there are i equally sized cohorts of unions and …rms: each period one cohort comes to the end of its contract and starts a new one. A standard Taylor model is represented by an economy in which one sector (usually i = 2 or 4) has a share of unity, the rest zero. In the GT E, in each sector i there is a Taylor contract; in the GF E, a Fischer-style contract.
The simple Calvo model is di¤erent from the GT E because the wage setters do not know how long the contract will last: each period a fraction ! of …rms/households chosen randomly start a new contract. However, the Calvo process can be described in deterministic terms at the aggregate level because the …rm-level randomness washes out. As shown in Dixon and Kara (2006a) , the distribution of contract lengths across …rms is given by
The detailed derivations can be found in the appendix of an earlier draft of this paper, ECB working paper 672, Understanding In ‡ation Persistence.
8 N can be in…nite.
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Calvo model with indexation has the same structure of contract lengths, but there is indexation throughout the contract life in response to past in ‡ation. The Mankiw-Reis sticky-information (SI) model is a special case of the GF E with the Calvo distribution of contract lengths.
The Macroeconomy.
Here we present a common framework in the form of a log-linearized macroeconomic model which re ‡ects the generic form that is derived from DSGE models with nominal rigidities in prices and/or wages. It is assumed that there is a …nal aggregate output produced from intermediate goods under constant returns which is available for consumption. The sectoral output level y it can be expressed as a function of the sectoral price p it relative to the aggregate price level p t and aggregate output y t where the coe¢ cient is the elasticity of demand (this is the log-linearization of a CES production function relating intermediate outputs to aggregate output):
In the intermediate good sector, labour is the only input and returns are constant, so that prices are a markup over wages, the markup being determined by the elasticity of demand . In log deviation form, sectoral price levels are given by the average wage set in the sector, and the wage is averaged over the i cohorts in sector i:
The log-linearized aggregate price index in the economy is the average of all sectoral prices:
The in ‡ation rate is given by t = p t p t 1 . We close the model with the demand side, which is given by a simple quantity theory relation:
The money supply follows the following process;
where 0 < v < 1 and t is a white noise process with zero mean and a …nite variance.
3.3 Wage-Setting Rules.
Before de…ning the optimal wage setting rules under di¤erent models, let us de…ne the optimal wage that would occur if wages were perfectly ‡exible (we call this "the optimal ‡ex wage"). The log-linearized version of the optimal ‡ex wage in each sector 9 is given by
with the coe¢ cient on output being:
Where cc = UccC Uc is the parameter governing risk aversion,
is the inverse of the labor elasticity, is the sectoral elasticity (1) We can represent the alternative wage-setting behaviour in terms of a two general equations: one for the reset wage in sector i (x it ), one for the average wage in sector i (w it ): For the GT E, these are 10 :
where ij = 1 i and 0 < a 1 measures the degree of indexation to the past in ‡ation rate. Without indexation (a = 0), the reset wage (8) in sector i 9 Note that the optimal ‡ex wage in each sector is the same. This is because it is based on the demand relation (1) which has the same two aggrgegate variables fp t ; y t g for each sector. Also, we make the common approximation for quarterly data that = 1.
10 The detailed derivations of the equations are presented in a technical appendix, which is available in the working paper version.
is simply the average (expected) optimal wage over the contract length (the nominal wage is constant over the contract length). Note that the reset wages will, in general, di¤er across sectors, since they take the average over a di¤erent time horizon. With indexation, the initial wage at the start of the contract is adjusted to take into account of future indexation over the lifetime of the contract. The average wage in sector i (9) is related to the past reset wages and how far they have been indexed.
The two equations (8 and 9) can also represent the simple Calvo economy. To obtain the simple Calvo economy from (8), all reset wages at time t are the same (x it = x t ), the summation is made with i = 1 and ij = !(1 !) j 1 : j = 1:::1: and there is no indexation a = 0: Assuming 0 < a 1 extends these model to the case in which the wages are indexed to past in ‡ation. The standard equation for the average wage is obtained by setting w it = w t , and setting the summation as i = 1 in (9).
In a GF E, the trajectory of wages is set at the outset of the contract. Suppose an i period contract starts at time t; then the sequence of wages chosen from t to t + i 1 is E t w t+s s=i 1 s=0
. Hence, the average wage in sector i at time t is
which is the average of the best guesses of each cohort for the optimal ‡ex wage to be holding at t and embodies "sticky information" idea in Fischer contracts: part of current wages are based on old information. In the GF E, since cohorts are of equal size within sector i, ij = 1 i
. The Mankiw-Reis sticky-information (SI) model has ij = ! (1 !) j 1 : j = 1::1:
3.4 The Choice of Parameters.
Following the literature, we set CC = 1 and LL = 4:5. The parameter determines the steady state markup 1 : Studies by Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) and Kimball (1995) Given the calibrated values of CC ; LL and ; we get a value of = 0:1, which is the value adopted by Mankiw and Reis (2002) and which we take as our initial reference value. With price setting, Chari et al. (2000) argue that the correct calibrated level of is much larger, being 1:2. However, Edge (2002) argues that these authors' …nding can be misleading, as their conclusion relies heavily on the assumption that all …rms use identical inputs: she demonstrates that if CKM were to assume a …rm speci…c labour market, then they would have obtained a similar value of whether price or wage setting is assumed 11 . One further rationale for lower values of is given by Kimball (1995) , who assumes that …rms are reluctant to increase their price above the average if demand for their own good decreases sharply. Several studies appeared recently in which the Kimball (1995) aggregator is assumed (e.g. Altig et al. (2004) , Coenen et al. (2007) , Smets, Wouters and de Walque (2006) ). Coenen et al. (2007) argue that there is a reasonable calibration of based on …rm-speci…c input that is consistent with a value of = 0:027. Non-microfounded econometric estimates of tend to be smaller: Taylor (1980) 4 The Impulse Response Functions for In ‡a-tion.
We …rst look at the Calvo simple Taylor (ST ) models. As is well known, neither of these fare well in modeling the stylised features. The policy we are simulating is a one o¤ 1% shock in at t = 0. In this section, all reported simulations adopt benchmark values = 0:1 and = 0:5: the latter implies a long-run cumulative e¤ect of 2% on in ‡ation from the AR(1) process (5).
The Problem : Standard Taylor and Calvo Models.
The Calvo (1983) pricing model has a single parameter: the reset probability or hazard rate, !, which gives the non-duration-dependent probability that a …rm/union will have the option to reset its wage in any period. Figure 2a illustrates the IRF of in ‡ation to a one percent innovation in the money supply. F igure 2 Calvo & Simple Taylor
As the …gure shows, the Calvo model cannot deliver a hump shaped in ‡a-tion response; the maximum is always in the …rst period (unless one imposes ex-ante pricing). As is well known (e.g., Woodford (2003) , chapter 3), the purely forward-looking nature of the Calvo model is the main reason for this result. On the other hand, Feature 3(b) is satis…ed for both values of !. The failure of the Calvo model to generate the observed responses of in ‡ation suggests that there might be a backward-looking element missing. The intertemporal backward-looking and forward-looking e¤ects in the Taylor model are emphasized by Taylor (1980) . Figure 2b displays the impulse response function of in ‡ation in Taylor's staggered contract model for contract lengths T = 2; 4; 6 and 8. The maximum in ‡ation response in Taylor's model is indeed delayed for a few quarters and it reaches its peak T 1 quarters after the …rst period in which the shock occurs 14 . There is a hump shape of sorts, but a rather jagged one. Hence Features 1 and 2 can be met. However, the simple Taylor contract will only generate a hump at around two-years if the contract lasts for that length of time (T = 8) which is in direct con ‡ict with the microdata PMD1. Furthermore, if we turn to Feature 3, in ‡ation dies away rapidly T periods after the shock. In particular, for T = 4, the e¤ects of the shock are almost gone after 15 periods; this certainly fails to meet even the weak criterion.
To summarise: Calvo can give us persistence (Feature 3) but no hump; Taylor gives us a hump at the length of the Taylor Contract, but fails Feature 3. The precise value of does not alter these conclusions much: Calvo always peaks on impact, Taylor T 1 periods after the shock whatever the value of , which in ‡uences persistence Feature 3. Taylor is inconsistent with the micro-data: even a simple Taylor with a mean of 4Q or 5Q will not display the distribution of lengths suggested by empirical studies. Calvo can be more consistent with P M D2, although the mean contract length requires a reset probability of ! = 0:4.
Solution 1: Indexation in the Calvo Model.
There has been much empirical work done on the New Keynesian Phillips curve. As is well known, it does not do well in explaining the data (see for example Gali and Gertler (1999) ). One model that does much better empirically is the hybrid Phillips curve, which takes the form
where 2 [0; 1] and = 0 gives the New Keynesian Phillips curve. This has given rise to attempts to construct a theoretical model that can yield (11). The currently popular theoretical justi…cation is to add indexation to the Calvo model (see for example Christiano et al. (2005) , Smets and Wouters (2003) , Woodford (2003) ) 15 : at the beginning of the contract the nominal wage is set, and for the contract duration this is updated by the previous period's in ‡ation (Christiano et al. (2005) call this "lagged in ‡ation indexation"). This hardwires lagged in ‡ation into current in ‡ation. Woodford (2003) shows how this gives rise to a HPC with = 0:5.
In Figure 3 , we display the response of in ‡ation to a monetary shock for ! = 0:25 and ! = 0:4 (average contract lengths of 7Q and 4Q respectively). As the …gure illustrates, introducing backward-looking indexation can a¤ect the impact of the shock on in ‡ation and leads to a hump shaped response. The model can satisfy Feature 1 and provide a hump peaking at 5 6Q. However, even when ! = 0:25, the model fails to generate enough persistence to satisfy Feature 3. Clearly, if we are thinking of prices, the notion of full indexation is inconsistent with the micro-data PMD2 and PMD1: a model with full or even partial indexation implies that every …rm adjusts its price every period.
Recent work by Ireland (2007) (see also Cogley and Sbordone (2005) ) argues that large and persistent movements in in ‡ation could not happen unless consistent with monetary policy and re ‡ecting implicit shifts in the in ‡ation target. Ireland (2007) considers this possibility by using a Calvo model that allows for continual movements in the central bank's in ‡ation target. The di¤erence between the Ireland model and the indexed-Calvo model is that the nominal wage-price is updated according to the central bank's in ‡ation target, rather than the pervious period's in ‡ation rate. Ireland compares the empirical performance of his model with that of the Calvo model with full indexation. He …nds that the new model performs better empirically than the indexed-Calvo model and, therefore, concludes that shifts in the central bank's in ‡ation target can substitute for backward-looking term in the Phillips curve in explaining in ‡ation. However, updating prices with the implicit in ‡ation target still falls foul of the microdata 16 .
Solution 2: Distributions of Fischer Contract Lengths.
In this section we consider a Generalized Fischer Economy (GF E): an economy with many sectors, each with a Fischer contract where the wage-setter chooses a trajectory of wages, one for each period for the whole length of the contract Fischer (1977) . The wages are thus conditional on the information the agent has when it sets the wages, so that as the contract gets older the information will be increasingly out of date 17 . There are two general points that need to be understood when interpreting the Fischer contracts. First, the IR functions are generated by a single innovation in the initial period. The initial shock is perpetuated because we assume that money follows an AR(1) process. However, any new contract that starts after the initial shock will be fully informed. Once all contracts have been renewed after the shock, the economy will behave as if there is full information and ‡exible wages/prices. The second point is that the length of the contract has no in ‡uence on the wages chosen for any speci…c period covered by the contract. This is because a separate wage can be chosen for each period within the contract. Therefore, it makes no di¤erence to the wage chosen for period 2 of the contract whether the contract will last for 2 16 Kiley (2005) adopts a slightly di¤erent approach to indexation. Kiley (2005) follows Gali and Gertler(1999) to assume a model with two di¤erent types of wage-setters: a proportion, (1 a) ; are Calvo wage-setters of the orthodox kind and the rest are "rule of thumb" agents who update using lagged in ‡ation; however, lagged in ‡ation is a moving average over the last b periods. Woodford (2003) is a special case when b = 1 and a = 0:5. Our adaptation of Kiley's approach has 4 parameters: fa; b; ; !g We take the value of = 0:1 and consider the two cases considered by Kiley for fa; bg = f0:24; 1g and f0:17; 4g with two values of (! = 0:25 and ! = 0:4). We …nd that the model's performance is not signi…cantly di¤erent from that of Woodford's model. More speci…cally, in this model there is a hump, but it peaks well before 8Q: In fact, it does not even reach 4Q even when ! = 0:25 with an average contract length of 7Q.
17 An alternative interpretation is that the …rm sets its wage or price optimally each period, but that it only updates its information infrequently. 13 periods or 10 periods: the period 2 wage will be its best guess at what the optimal wage is going to be in that period.
Mankiw and Reis's Sticky Information model (SI) is a GF E where the distribution of contract lengths is Calvo with their choice of ! = 0:25, resulting in an average length of 7 quarters. The parameter ! is presented as a "re-plan" probability 18 : just as in the Calvo model, when the trajectory of wages is chosen at the outset of the contract, the wage-setter does not know how long it will last but has a subjective distribution over the lifetime. However, as we have noted, the length of the contract has no in ‡uence on the wage-setting behavior. Hence the SI model as presented by Mankiw and Reis is exactly the same as a Calvo-GF E: an economy where there is a Calvo distribution of contract lengths but in which each wage setter knows exactly how long the contract will run for. With Fischer contracts, the Calvo reset probability is only important in generating the distribution of durations: nothing else.
In Figure 4 we depict the IR functions for the SI model with ! = 0:25. The SI model has a smooth hump, peaking at the 8th quarter, and in ‡ation dies away slowly so that Feature 3(b) is satis…ed. The reason for this shape is the distribution of contract lengths and in particular the longer contracts that let in ‡ation persist. Hence, introducing heterogeneity into the Fischer model moves the model in the direction of explaining all three facts. With a Fischer contract, the price or wage setter tries to predict the optimal ‡ex price or wage. Since this depends on the general price level, the trajectory of prices builds in anticipated in ‡ation. The monetary policy IR has a hump shape because most …rms have to wait to replan their price-plans once the new policy is in e¤ect. Thus, for those yet to revise their plans, the pre-shock in ‡ationary expectations are driving their prices. The Calvo distribution ensures that the hump is smooth and peaks at the required time.
As in the case of Calvo with indexation, in ‡ation is "built in" in a way that is not consistent with the micro data: prices change every period and the calibrated value of ! = 0:25 implies a mean contract length across …rms much longer than 4 quarters. However, since the "contract" here refers to a planning horizon, there is no clear-cut microeconomic evidence for its appropriate calibration. However long or short the "contract", prices change every period which violates both PMD1 and PMD2.
Solution 3: Distributions of Taylor Contract Lengths.
In this section, we now return to simple Taylor contracts, but with a distribution of contract lengths, considering two special GT Es. These di¤er in the share of weights across di¤erent durations, i : The Calvo-GT E, in which the share of each duration across …rms is the same as generated by the Calvo model 19 : for ! = 0:25; which has a mean contract length of 7Q and a modal lengths of 3 and 4Q. Second we use the distribution of duration data using the Bils and Klenow (2004) as shown in Figure 1 .
The in ‡ation impulse-responses for these two distributions of contract lengths are depicted Figure 5 . We can see immediately that adding a distribution of contract lengths has greatly improved the …t of the IRF s compared to the simple Taylor contract. They now have a hump, with the Calvo-GT E peaking at 4Q, although the peak is too soon for B K (2Q). Furthermore, they both have enough of persistence to satisfy Feature 3. The distributions are quite di¤erent: the B K has fatter tails: the modal frequency is quarterly and the mean is a less than the Calvo with ! = 0:25.
The comparison between the simple Calvo and the Calvo-GT E deserves some thought. They di¤er in the wage-setting decisions: in the Calvo model the wage-setters do not know the length of their contract, but have a probability distribution over contract lengths and hence all wage-setters set the same price. In the Calvo-GT E; each wage-setter knows its contract length when it sets the wage. As we can see, in terms of Feature 1, the Calvo-GT E does have a hump shape. Hence moving from the Calvo economy to the GT E with the same distribution of contract lengths lets us satisfy Feature 1 in addition to Feature 3. The intuition for this is that when …rms set the wage or price in period t in the Calvo-GT E, they know the length of their contract, and for the purpose of setting their wage or price need not think further ahead. This makes price and wage setters more myopic: whereas in the simple Calvo …rms must look ahead into the distant future when setting their price, in the corresponding GT E they need only look forward as far as their next contract. This makes the Calvo resetter react more initially, because it is looking ahead to future in ‡ation.
If we use exactly the same distribution of contract lengths as in the SI and Calvo with indexation, the Calvo-GT E with ! = 0:25, we can see that we can have a model that is more consistent with the microdata PMD2 and which gives a hump at 4Q and so is consistent with the rapid view Feature 3(a). However, it has the drawback of a mean contract length that is almost twice as long as PMD1.
Role of the Key Parameter :
We have thus far considered the ability of the di¤erent models with calibrated parameters values to match the key features. We now examine how the changes in the key parameters in ‡uence the models with respect to macroeconomic Features 1-3 20 . The parameter is important as it determines the in ‡ationary pressure on wages and prices that results from an increase in output. A low value of means that this in ‡ationary pressure works through more slowly so that the reaction of in ‡ation to output growth becomes slower. Table 1 shows how Features 1-3 fare for each of the models at the di¤erent reference levels of discussed in section 3.4: 0:1; 0:05; 0:027; 0:01; and 0:005. Where there are weak and strong criteria (Features 2 and 3), the more ticks indicate that the stronger criterion being met. Table 2 gives the exact timing of peak in ‡ation.
T able 1 Features 1-3 as varies.
T able 2: The peak response. .
Let us …rst take the case of the models with the Calvo distribution of contract lengths in which prices change every quarter: SI; IC. With the standard Calibration of ! = 0:25; both models satisfy F1 and strong F3 for all values of . The key issue is the timing of peak in ‡ation (F2), given in Table 2 , which gets more delayed as falls. Sticky information meets the moderate view at = 0:1, and gets longer as gets smaller. Indexed-Calvo meets the moderate view somewhere between = 0:1 and = 0:027. These models both perform well at the macro-level, but at the cost of violating the microdata. If we impose the Calibration ! = 0:4, then we see that matters are di¤erent. For the IC and SI, F3 is not satis…ed in even its weak form when 0:027: The moderate view of the peak is attained only when < 0:027. 20 Clearly, has no e¤ect on or relevance for microeconomic features PMD1 and PMD2.
Turning to the Calvo GT E, we see that with ! = 0:25, F1 and F3 are satis…ed for all . The peak response meets the rapid criterion for = 0:1 and the moderate when = 0:027. This model has a distribution of contract durations, but the mean is too long. If we impose PMD1 and set ! = 0:4, then the resulting Calvo distribution is much closer to the microdata on both counts. For 0:027; the rapid peak and also the strong view of F3 are both satis…ed. Thus, the Calvo GT E is the only model with the Calvo distribution that is consistent with the microdata and also can satisfy the macro features F1-3. However, the peak response will be too rapid for many macroeconomists.
Lastly, we can look at the BK GT E, which has the actual empirical distribution of contract lengths which by construction satis…es PMD1 and PMD2. For all values of , F1 and F3 are satis…ed. What of the peak in ‡ation? Well, for "calibrated" = 0:027; the peak is at 3Q. This "almost" satis…es the rapid view (recall that we can follow Woodford (2003, p. 207-213) and introduce pre-set pricing to add an extra quarter lag into the pricing decision, taking the peak response form 3 to 4Q). What is more interesting is what happens when = 0:01: Even though the BK GT E has an average contract length of 4:4Q, it peaks at 7Q. This would both satisfy the moderate view of peak in ‡ation and be consistent with the microdata. However, as yet this can only be attained at a value of below the lowest "calibrated" value currently proposed.
When there is a distribution of contract lengths, a decrease in will tend to delay the maximum impact if there is already a hump shape and will move the models with a distribution signi…cantly towards explaining all three features. In fact, this …nding, to a large extent, explains the result obtained by Coenen et al. (2007) . There, it is argued that a model with Taylor style contracts that allows for a distribution of contract lengths and assumes a Kimball(1995) aggregator along with the assumption of …rm-speci…c input, which helps to lower ( = 0:027); …ts the German data and the US data very well without needing the assumption of backward-looking indexation. makers feel are the features of the response of in ‡ation to monetary policy re ‡ected in our stylized "features". This problem has lead to two main responses in the literature: the introduction of indexation into the Calvo model, and the adoption of Fischer contracts and a Calvo distribution of Contract lengths (Sticky Information). Both of these theories are inconsistent with the micro data on prices: not only do all prices change each period, but also with standard calibrations the average duration of contracts across …rms is nearly twice as long as the Bils-Klenow data set suggests, and is almost as long as the "moderate" view of the hump at 8Q.
We have explored an alternative approach which is to keep to simple contracts which specify a given nominal wage or price for a speci…c length of time, but explicitly model the distribution o¤ contract lengths. We do this for two types of distribution: the Bils-Klenow distribution and the Calvo distribution. We …nd that we can obtain a hump-shaped response with plenty of persistence. With the calibration suggested by Coenen et al. (2007) the Calvo GT E is the only model that can satisfy all three in ‡ation-persistence features, with the hump occurring at 4Q (the rapid view) and is consistent with the microdata PMD1-2. However, we have found the interesting phenomenon that for lower values of the parameter the hump in in ‡ation can peak at 7Q or more with the empirical Bils-Klenow distribution, which is much longer than the mean contract length. We …nd that this is the only theory that is consistent with the micro-data on prices and can potentially explain in ‡ation persistence. 
